Negotiating public service bargains in postrevolutionary times: The case of Iran's diplomatic corps
研究了伊朗伊斯兰共和国如何通过重新设计官僚机构，在革命后培养忠诚、专业且具代表性的外交官，以平衡政治控制与治理效率。
Abstract New political regimes stemming from revolutions eventually find themselves confronted with the imperative to build upper bureaucratic apparatuses geared towards facilitating regime stability. This article examines the process of “re‐bureaucratization” in the Islamic Republic of Iran, whereby institutions are designed and reworked over time to accommodate distinct features of the reshuffled bureaucratic elite initially incongruous in a deregulated revolutionary environment. Precisely, it examines state institutions established to recruit and train postrevolutionary Iranian diplomats following the purges of state bureaucracies. Relying on qualitative and quantitative data, the article shows how such institutions allowed to outstrip loyalty‐driven politico‐administrative arrangements that are essentially short‐sighted, as once their aim fulfilled—asserting regime elites' control over the state—, they channel policy‐making deficiency. Conversely, their very designs craft a “Public Service Bargain” that concomitantly fosters diplomats' loyalty, expertise, and representativeness—which, for to the revolutionary canon, commingles diplomats' plebeianization and provincialization—into stabilized institutional arrangements.