Passive insider trading before pension freezes
研究了养老金冻结前内幕交易模式，发现非高管和机会主义交易者通过减少股票卖出增加净买入，这种被动交易不受流动性或投资组合影响，凸显内幕交易监管的不足。
Abstract We study the patterns of insider trading surrounding pension freezes, a widespread corporate event that creates firm value and generates positive abnormal returns. We find that insiders—particularly nonsenior executive insiders (rather than senior executive insiders) and opportunistic traders (rather than routine traders)—effectively increase their net purchases by reducing their sales of company stocks 1 year before pension freezes. Such passive insider trading does not appear to be driven by liquidity needs or portfolio choices. Overall, our findings highlight the heterogeneity of insiders and limitation of existing insider trading regulations, calling for policy makers’ attention to this insider behavior.