The Effects of a U.S. Approach to Enforcement: Evidence from China
研究中国实施美国式强制披露执法的影响，发现公司虽按问询函要求逐点回应，但信息环境未显著改善，表明激励比监管更重要。
Abstract We examine the effects of implementing a U.S. approach to the enforcement of mandatory disclosure in China. Using a hand-collected sample of comment letters (CLs) issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period of 2013 to 2018, we show that stock price reactions to CL receipts and replies are negative and significant. Using textual analysis to match issues raised by regulators to targeted firms’ changes in disclosure, we show that these firms do address CL issues point by point, but do not experience significant improvements in their information environments. Our article highlights the importance of incentives rather than regulation/enforcement in reducing information asymmetry.