Too Much of a Good Thing? Board Independence and the Value of Initial Public Offerings
基于代理理论和资源依赖理论，研究发现董事会独立性与IPO价值呈倒U型关系，即独立性超过一定阈值反而降低公司价值，且该关系受所有权与控制权分离、行业多元化及CEO与董事长职务分离等因素调节。
Abstract Building on agency and resource dependence theories, we study the relationship between the value of initial public offerings and the extent of board independence, which we find to be an inverted U‐shape: beyond a certain threshold, board independence becomes excessive. Consistent with agency theory, the inverted U‐shaped relationship is more pronounced when ownership and control rights are separated. Consistent with resource dependence theory, the inverted U‐shaped relationship is more pronounced in companies with higher industry diversification and less pronounced when the roles of the CEO and president of the board of directors are separated.