Selling Mechanism Design for Peer-to-Peer Lending and Related Markets: The Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Open Auction Versus Fixed Price
研究了P2P借贷、股权众筹和IPO市场中统一价格拍卖被固定价格取代的趋势，发现统一价格拍卖会导致更多羊群行为和策略性延迟投标，降低交易完成概率和预期收入，与Prosper平台及文献中的实证规律一致。
In the past two decades, there has been a decline in the use of uniform-price auctions in favor of fixed prices in markets of peer-to-peer lending, equity crowdfunding, and initial public offerings. This article aims to analytically study why this trend might be occurring. The analysis reveals that, relative to a fixed price, a uniform-price auction leads to more herding and strategic delay of bid submission and, consequently, a smaller transaction completion probability and lower expected revenue. These predictions are consistent with the empirical regularities observed for the bidding behavior and funding outcomes on Prosper, one of the leading peer-to-peer online lending platforms, and those documented in the literature for markets of equity crowdfunding and initial public offerings.