Investment Strategies and Corporate Behaviour with Socially Responsible Investors: A Theory of Active Ownership
研究了社会责任投资者如何通过投票等主动所有权行为促使企业采取负责任策略，发现即使多数投资者不负责任，企业也可能选择负责任策略，但这种选择可能依赖于投资者的自我实现信念。
Socially responsible investors constitute an important force in today's global financial markets. This paper examines conditions under which socially responsible investors induce companies to behave responsibly. We develop an asset pricing model in which some shareholders are active owners, that is, they engage companies by voting on strategic decisions. Differences of objective among shareholders arise because socially responsible investors value corporate externalities. In our baseline model, we show that a firm may choose a responsible strategy even if the majority of investors are not responsible. We also demonstrate that such a choice of a responsible strategy might be fragile because it might depend on investors' self‐fulfilling beliefs. We then extend our baseline model to analyse the link between divestment and engagement strategies, the case with multiple firms, the role of benefit corporation charters, and the impact of a large investor.