Optimal hedging in the presence of internal flexibility
研究了内部灵活性如何影响最优对冲策略，发现内部灵活性降低了对冲工具的边际价值，导致财务对冲具有选择性且依赖于投资机会，并揭示了不同发展阶段对冲与营销策略的复杂互动。
Abstract Internal flexibility aids in risk management and has a broader application than hedging instruments. This paper demonstrates how optimal hedging policies are affected by it. We develop a dynamic risk management model to capture financial and operational decisions. We first show that internal flexibility reduces the marginal value of hedging instruments. As a result, optimal financial hedging is selective and dependent on investment opportunities. These opportunities account for the majority of the difference between hedged and unhedged firms. By incorporating internal flexibility, the model becomes more realistic but also generates a complex interaction between financial hedging and marketing strategy. During the growth phase, hedging instruments are partially substitutive but have a synergistic effect on investment. In the mature or declining phase, the remedial effect of marketing strategy maintains investment, thereby increasing operating risk and the marginal value of financial hedging. These results are applicable to firms free of agency conflicts and provide a solid theoretical basis for future empirical tests. We advise that scholars thoroughly examine internal flexibility and development stages in the process.