Optimal trade credit coordination policy in dual-channel supply chain with consumer transfer
研究了资金约束的双渠道供应链中，制造商通过贸易信贷协调与零售商的关系，发现贸易信贷能缓解零售商资金压力、促进订货，但也增加违约风险，并分析了消费者转移率对贸易信贷参数的影响。
The boom in online sales has inspired the enthusiasm of manufacturers to include their own online sale channel with the retailer’s offline channel. This paper investigates the impact of consumer transfer in a capital-constraint dual-channel supply chain and examines the optimal operational decision by considering a Stackelberg game. We capture the trade credit coordination mechanism of the supply chain facing with stochastic demand. The results show that trade credit contract would alleviate financial pressure of the capital-constraint retailer and achieve coordination in the dual-channel supply chain. Besides, the adoption of trade credit stimulates the ordering behaviour of retailers. However, by using trade credit, the default risk increases for the capital-constraint retailer compared to the retailer with sufficient capital. The manufacturer shares the risk with the retailer by trade credit in dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the effects of consumer transfer rates on the setting of the trade credit parameters are also presented in this paper.