Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis
研究了同时第一价格拍卖中竞标者对组合标的的非加性偏好，建立了非参数识别方法，并用密歇根州高速公路采购数据量化了成本协同效应及拍卖机制表现。
Abstract Motivated by the prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have non-additive preferences over combinations. We establish non-parametric identification of primitives in this model under standard exclusion restrictions, providing a basis for both estimation and testing of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to data on Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) highway procurement auctions, quantifying the magnitude of cost synergies and evaluating the performance of the simultaneous first-price mechanism in the MDOT marketplace.