Bank Competition and Borrower Conservatism
利用1994年《里格尔-尼尔州际银行与分行效率法》的逐步实施，研究银行竞争如何降低美国上市借款人的会计保守主义，并分析其背后的投资与风险承担动机。
ABSTRACT We study the influence of bank competition on U.S. public borrowers’ accounting conservatism by exploiting the staggered adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994, which increased the threats of new bank entrants and actual bank entry. We find that borrowers’ conditional conservatism fell after IBBEA. Conservatism fell more for firms located in states with weak incumbent banks and states with more out-of-state entrants, especially entrants with better monitoring technologies. The decrease in conservatism partially stems from borrowers’ increased investment and risk-taking incentives. Conservatism fell more for firms relying more on bank loans, especially those that borrowed loans for the first time after IBBEA and for firms having lower dedicated institutional ownership and board independence. We also find that loans included fewer covenants and that bank loan borrowers became less likely to choose Big N auditors and industry specialist auditors after IBBEA. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; K23; M41.