Stakeholder Orientation and Bank Payout Policy: Evidence from US Constituency Statutes
利用美国各州选区法规的逐步实施作为准自然实验，研究发现银行控股公司在实施该法规后总支付显著下降，主要由股票回购减少驱动，且这一效应在隐性索赔大、透明度低和代理冲突严重的银行中更强。
Abstract We investigate the impact of stakeholder orientation on bank payout policy. As a quasi‐experimental setting, we exploit the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across US states, which broaden the scope of managerial duties to an extended group of stakeholders. The results of a difference‐in‐differences analysis suggest that bank holding companies (BHCs) incorporated in states enacting constituency statutes experience significant declines in total payouts, which is driven by a decline in share repurchases. This observed decline in share repurchases is stronger for banks with sizeable implicit claims, lower transparency and substantial agency conflicts. These findings remain intact following a myriad of robustness checks and alternative estimation techniques.