Price competition with a stake in your rival
研究了双寡头市场中，收入分享和利润分享利益关联如何影响价格竞争强度，发现收入分享比利润分享更能抑制竞争（导致更高价格），并解释了利益关联如何改变企业间的竞争互动。
We examine how revenue-sharing and profit-sharing stakes affect price competition intensity under duopoly. Our analysis builds on the price competition framework introduced by Varian (1980) and accounts for fundamental asymmetries in terms of cost and consumer loyalty. A stake exists when a firm appropriates a share of its rival’s revenues or profits. For example, a marketplace owner that charges a third-party seller an ad valorem fee on its sales has a revenue-sharing stake, and a firm holding a minority ownership participation in another has a profit-sharing stake. We show that a revenue-sharing stake always has a stronger competition-dampening effect (leads to higher prices) than a profit-sharing stake, and explain how the introduction of a stake affects the intensity of competition between firms. Our analysis generates new insight into how stakes affect competitive interaction in the marketplace.