Stability and Regime Change: The Evolution of Accounting Standards
通过动态投票模型研究会计监管的演进，发现披露政策与企业家投资相互影响，导致会计制度稳定或变迁，监管干预和意外冲击可改变制度。
ABSTRACT We examine the evolution of accounting regulation by linking disclosure policies and investments in a dynamic voting model. The disclosure policies are the outcome of voting by entrepreneurs, whose preferences are influenced by their investments. The investments are in turn endogenously determined by current and future disclosure policies. Absent external influences, accounting regimes are stable. A disclosure regime of high (low) quality and a strong (weak) economy coexist and reinforce each other. However, regulatory interventions can result in regime changes by changing the entrepreneurs’ expectations, even without direct enforcement. Unexpected shocks could also result in regime changes by impacting economic conditions and hence voter composition. Our analysis provides a framework to study the interaction between accounting regulation and firms’ economic decisions.