Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints
研究了在弱优先级和复杂约束下分配稀缺资源的问题，提出基于竞争稳定均衡的机制，在课程分配、医疗配给和难民安置等场景中优于现有方法，兼顾效率与公平。
Allocating scarce resources with (weak) priority and complex constraints has many applications ranging from course allocation, and healthcare rationing to refugee resettlement. Its generality, however, mostly leads to impossibility results. We offer a positive result with a mechanism based on a new concept called competitive stable equilibrium. This is a natural extension of competitive equilibrium with endowed budgets that accommodates weak priorities. Specifically, an agent only needs to pay for a resource if it belongs to the last tier among the agents currently consuming the resource. This concept applies to both frameworks of one-sided and two-sided markets in a unifying way and allows for a more flexible tie-breaking rule by giving agents different budgets. We empirically apply our mechanism to reassign season tickets to families in the presence of social distancing. Our simulation results show that our method outperforms existing ones in both efficiency and fairness measures.