Anti‐Mafia Police Actions, Criminal Firms, and Peer Firm Tax Avoidance
研究发现，意大利反黑手党警察行动移除犯罪企业后，同行企业减少了避税行为，同时业绩改善、投资增加、原材料成本下降，揭示了黑手党影响企业行为和本地经济的微观渠道。
ABSTRACT Mafia firms introduce distortions in the markets in which they operate, increasing the cost of doing business for peer firms. We investigate whether peers respond by increasing their tax avoidance and thus increasing funds available to compete with the Mafia firms. Using a sample of Italian anti‐Mafia police actions that resulted in the removal of Mafia firms and a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that peers reduce their tax avoidance following these actions. We further show that, following anti‐Mafia police actions, peer firms improve their performance and increase capital investment while enjoying a reduction in the cost of raw materials. Overall, our results highlight the microlevel channels through which Mafia can affect firm outcomes and local economies.