Contracts and Induced Institutional Change
研究代理人如何在委托人提供垂直合同前形成横向联盟，以及这种合同诱致的制度变迁如何损害委托人利益，甚至使合同适得其反。对污染监管、森林保护支付、供应商-加盟商合并等应用有参考价值。
Abstract We study agents’ incentives to form horizontal coalitions before a principal offers vertical contracts. When a vertical contract generates negative externalities on other agents, the agents may collude in order to obtain better deals; when one contract benefits other agents, the agents may decentralize, instead. Contractually induced institutional changes always harm the principal and the negative effect can outweigh the direct effects of the contracts, making the contracts counterproductive. The model is tractable and sufficiently flexible to be relevant for applications such as regulation of pollution, payments for forest conservation, and mergers between firms in a supplier–franchisee relationship..