Credit Union and Bank Subprime Lending in the Great Recession
研究发现，2006年商业银行的次级贷款比例（23.6%）远高于信用合作社（3.6%），且银行在金融危机后更易倒闭、违约率更高，这归因于信用合作社的非营利合作结构使其更规避风险。
Abstract Firm structure affects incentives and performance. We document significant differences in subprime lending between banks and credit unions prior to and during the Great Recession. In 2006, 23.6% of mortgages from commercial banks were subprime versus only 3.6% of mortgages from credit unions. Moreover, banks were more likely to fail, and had higher delinquency and net charge-off ratios immediately following the financial crisis. Our empirical models control for important differences between credit unions and banks including firm-level characteristics, borrower-level characteristics, and state-level economic conditions. We argue that the remaining difference captures the effects of credit unions’ nonprofit and cooperative structure, which encourages them to internalize the utility of their customer-owners. Our findings explain why credit unions often appear more risk averse relative to commercial banks, a result with important research and policy implications.