Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
研究在参与者承担有限责任时，如何设计无需先验信息的动态分配机制，近似实现VCG机制的效率，并利用谨慎与宽容策略实现近似再谈判证明。
A principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail‐free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the performance of the pivot VCG mechanism using limited liability detail‐free mechanisms that selectively ignore reports from participants who cannot make their promised payments. A complementary use of cautiousness and forgiveness achieves approximate renegotiation‐proofness. We emphasize the use of prior‐free online optimization techniques to approximate aggregate incentive properties of the pivot mechanism.