Monotone contracts
构建了一个框架，推导对称信息下长期随机合同中的动态单调性结果，提出“凹可分活动”概念，并给出条件使这类活动在合同中呈现资历效应，即随时间变化有利于代理人。
We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long‐term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the activity over time favors the agent. Our work unifies and significantly generalizes many existing results and can also be used to establish monotonicity results in other settings of interest.