The Limits of ONETARY ECONOMICS: On Money as a Constraint on Market Power
研究了在信贷、结算或支付服务中介存在不完全竞争时，货币作为交易媒介的功能如何增强商品和服务卖方相对于中介的议价能力，并表明即使卖方从未实际使用货币交易，这种机制依然有效，从而挑战了货币政策仅通过信贷渠道传导的传统观点。
We formulate a generalization of the traditional medium‐of‐exchange function of money in contexts where there is imperfect competition in the intermediation of credit, settlement, or payment services used to conduct transactions. We find that the option to settle transactions with money strengthens the stance of sellers of goods and services in relation to intermediaries, and show this mechanism is operative even for sellers who never exercise the option to sell for money. These latent money demand considerations imply that in general, in contrast to current conventional wisdom in policy‐oriented research in monetary economics, monetary policy can remain effective through medium‐of‐exchange transmission channels—even in highly developed credit economies where the share of monetary transactions is negligible.