Persuasion with unknown beliefs
研究了发送者在不知道接收者先验信念时如何设计信息结构来说服对方，发现最优信号有两个实现，且形状为双曲线，相比标准模型会在更多状态下推荐高行动但概率更低。
A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this environment. I show that there exists an optimal signal with two realizations, characterize the support of the signal realization recommending approval,, and show that the optimal signal is a hyperbola. The lack of knowledge of the receiver's prior causes the sender to hedge her bets: the optimal signal induces the high action in more states than in the standard model, albeit with a lower probability. Increasing the sender's ignorance can hurt both the sender and the receiver.