Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
研究一个随机利益环境中的动态信号传递博弈，代理人根据声誉和外部利益决定是否退出，弱类型通过在新低利益时继续来建立声誉，适用于企业声誉管理和在线商家声誉等场景。
We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand.