Agency Conflicts and Investment: Evidence from a Structural Estimation
构建动态资本结构模型，研究经理与股东间的代理冲突如何影响融资与投资决策，发现平均而言企业轻微过度投资，且CEO年龄和任期影响投资行为。
Abstract We develop a dynamic capital structure model to study how agency conflicts between managers and shareholders affect the joint determination of financing and investment decisions. We show that there are two agency conflicts with opposing effects on a manager’s choice of investment: first, the consumption of private benefits channel leads managers not only to choose a lower optimal leverage, but also to underinvest, and second, compensation linked to firm size may lead managers to overinvest. We fit the model to the data and show that the average firm slightly overinvests, younger CEOs invest more than older ones, while CEOs with longer tenure overinvest more than CEOs with shorter tenure.