Games with switching costs and endogenous references
提出一个包含转换成本和内生参照点的博弈模型，定义转换成本纳什均衡（SNE），证明其存在性及与纳什均衡的差异，并应用于产品差异化模型，得出转换成本可能有利于消费者的结论。
We introduce a game‐theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one‐player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε ‐equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium .