Informative tests in signaling environments
研究了接收者在信号环境中如何选择信息性测试，发现测试的优劣顺序不遵循布莱克威尔顺序，可能解释分数膨胀和信息粗化现象。
We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relation over tests needs not comply with Blackwell's (1951) order. Our findings may shed light on phenomena such as grade inflation and information coarsening.