Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers
研究英国急诊医生在四小时等待时间激励政策下的行为变化，发现政策虽扭曲医疗决策但显著降低死亡率，表明约束医生可带来成本有效的生命拯救。
Abstract We study how emergency department (ED) doctors respond to incentives to reduce wait times. We use bunching techniques to study an English policy that imposed strong incentives to treat patients within four hours. The policy reduced time spent in the ED by 21 minutes for affected patients yet caused doctors to increase treatment intensity and admit more patients. We find a striking 14% reduction in mortality. Analysis of patient severity and hospital crowding strongly suggests it is the wait time reduction that saves lives. We conclude that, despite distorting medical decisions, constraining ED doctors can induce cost-effective reductions in mortality.