Stackelberg Independence*
研究了标准斯塔克尔伯格模型中领导者行动的信息含量，发现线性需求等假设下领导者行动独立于跟随者到达信念，但非线性需求、非恒定边际成本等微小偏离会使其完全失去信息。
The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders’ actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders’ beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions’ being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non‐linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non‐identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders’ choices completely uninformative.