Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
研究了社会选择对应在纳什均衡下能否通过自身作为博弈形式来实施，给出了两人或两方案情形下所有一致且匿名的自实施对应的完整刻画，并探讨了多方案情形下的边界条件。
Abstract A social choice correspondence is Nash self-implementable if it can be implemented in Nash equilibrium by a social choice function that selects from it as the game form. We provide a complete characterization of all unanimous and anonymous Nash self-implementable social choice correspondences when there are two agents or two alternatives. For the case of three agents and three alternatives, only the top correspondence is Nash self-implementable. In all other cases, every Nash self-implementable social choice correspondence contains the top correspondence and is contained in the Pareto correspondence. In particular, when the number of alternatives is at least four, every social choice correspondence containing the top correspondence plus the intersection of the Pareto correspondence with a fixed set of alternatives, is self-implementable.