Financial disclosure transparency and employee wages
研究发现，财务披露不透明的公司会支付更高的员工工资，尤其是在员工信息获取成本高、工资议价能力强或持股较多时，表明披露选择对员工这一重要利益相关者产生了外部性。
Abstract We test the hypothesis that less transparent financial disclosures are an undesirable firm attribute that increase the amount of information and unemployment risk that employees bear, resulting in a wage premium. Using establishment‐level wage data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document that firms with less transparent disclosures pay their employees more, especially when employees bear greater information acquisition costs, have more influence in the wage‐setting process, and own more stock. Our results hold after utilizing instrumental variables and exploiting two quasi‐natural experiments. Overall, our results suggest that disclosure choices can generate externalities on an important group of stakeholders.