After Merkel – The 2021 German Election and its Implications for European Union Politics
本文分析2021年德国大选后新联合政府的政党立场，从决策一体化、财政转移与纪律、共同安全与防务政策三个维度，探讨德国在欧盟角色转变及其对欧洲一体化的影响。
The succession of numerous crises – such as the Euro-crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, democratic backsliding in some Member States, the Covid pandemic, and, lately, military escalation at the EU eastern borders - has challenged European integration but also generated new calls for further integration (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Jones, 2012; Kriesi, 2018; Nicolaïdis, 2010; Schmidt, 2009; Truchlewski et al., 2021; Tsoukalis, 2011; Wolff & Ladi, 2020). Those calls increasingly envisage better decision-making structures, as well as the political and fiscal authority that increases Europeans' strategic sovereignty and that involves the capacity to act in response to challenging circumstances. However, reforms require agreement and compromises among European institutions and Member States. One of the masters of finding pragmatic compromise was Angela Merkel, chancellor for 16 years of the most important economy of the Union. In a lineage with a series of Christian democratic leaders, Angela Merkel has been a convinced European and her approach has importantly shaped the European Union. But the impetus of the Christian Democratic impulse for Europe might have already witnessed a transition during Markel's tenure. Merkel was unwilling to invest and buy into risks for Europe; unlike earlier Christian Democrats, she preferred a pragmatic intergovernmental approach. In 2017, Macron invited Merkel in three different speeches to implement far-reaching economic and fiscal reforms in the European Union. Merkel answered with silence. Merkel rarely put visions at the forefront of her approach, relying instead on a clear sense of the feasible. The European Union owes this approach a lot but at the same time, it might have hampered fundamental adjustments that many see unavoidable in light of the accumulation of challenges ahead of us. In this article, I argue that the end of Angela Merkel and her replacement with a coalition including the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party (Greens) and the Liberal Party (FDP) in 2021 substantially changes the German role within the European Union. To make the case, I describe the positions of major German parties in the run-up to the 2021 election and describe the preferences towards the European Union of the emerging coalition. I relate those positions to a three-dimensional portrayal of European conflicts. The first is about supranational integration versus national sovereignty in the decision-making processes, the second is about fiscal transfers versus fiscal discipline, and the third is about a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The results demonstrate that in the domain of the integration of decision-making processes as well as in the domain of CSDP, all major German parties see the necessity for deeper integration. In light of the new European momentum caused by Putin's invasion of Ukraine, a push for European integration would most likely also be supported by a hypothetical government participation of the CDU. The pro-integration consensus, however, does not extend to the fiscal dimension of Europe. On the one hand, the SPD and in particular the Greens signaled far-reaching support for significant steps towards a real transfer Union, including genuine European revenues and investments while lowering the priority for fiscal oversight and discipline. On the other hand, the FDP signaled the opposite and managed to place significant safeguards for fiscal discipline in the coalition contract. Nonetheless, without the CDU in government, the fiscal position of Germany within Europe has shifted from a strong commitment to fiscal discipline toward more ambiguous positions including a hesitant commitment to European taxes, investments and transfers. This re-orientation will weaken the coalition of the fiscal discipline camp within Europe and opens up new ways to complement the rising political authority of Europe with fiscal authority. Whatever describes Germany's role within Europe it is important to have a look at the genuine preferences of German parties and governments. The political science and political economy literature urge us to think of positions toward the European Union in at least three dimensions. The most basic division in EU politics is the conflict between advocates of more vs. less integration (Haas, 1958). There is widespread support for European Integration in general 1 but the conflict remains about national sovereignty vs. supranational governance. Today, key debates about supranational governance involve the role of the European Parliament, unanimity or majority voting in the European Council, and the enforcement of the rule of law. These issues recently gained traction within a broader debate on the European Union's capacity to respond to the war in Ukraine and the inflation of crises. In short, the objective is to prepare European institutions to act according to the idea of European strategic autonomy in the wake of a new confrontation of superpowers. A look at the manifestos for the run-up to the election in 2021 indicates widespread consensus about the general integration issues among the four major German parties with realistic chances to end up in the cabinet. 2 The Greens, the Liberal Party (FDP), the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) all demand the empowerment of the European Parliament in at least three ways. A common European electoral system (including European lists), the right to initiate laws, and the right to elect and de-select the head of the European Commission (constructive vote of no confidence). Furthermore, all four major parties demand the extension of qualified majority decision-making instead of unanimity in the European Council. Finally, all four parties agree to strengthen the mechanism of the rule of law including the possibility of severe sanctions in case of misbehaviour. 3 From this baseline consensus, the FDP and in particular the Greens set a tone of further impulses for deeper supranational integration. Both parties highlight the Conference on the Future of Europe as the starting point for a constitutional convention, aiming at a European Constitution as a foundation for a federal Union (FDP) or even a Federal Republic of Europe (Greens). The Greens even demand European Citizenship including the right for European residents in Germany to vote at all levels. Greens effectively envisage a supranational Europe that is organized around a federal parliamentary system with a second chamber. Besides traditional conflict over supranational integration, the political economy literature suggests adding a divide between advocates of fiscal transfers and fiscal discipline (Armingeon & Cranmer, 2017; Beramendi & Stegmueller, 2017; Frieden & Walter, 2017; Johnston et al., 2014; Lehner & Wasserfallen, 2019). This divide is independent of the integration as well as the left and right divide. Advocates of fiscal discipline argue that the violations of debt rules destabilize the EMU. Accordingly, they call for the strengthening of fiscal oversight with strict deficit and debt rules (De Grauwe, 2013; White, 2015). Supporters of fiscal transfers, however, point to economic imbalances within the monetary union as the underlying cause of the crisis, calling for permanent and comprehensive fiscal equalization within the monetary union in the form of a fiscal transfer system, a common budget based on European taxes, and a common unemployment scheme (Brunnermeier et al., 2016). They argue that economically stronger countries have to financially support the weaker Member States, which lost in the monetary union the option of devaluation as an instrument to regain economic competitiveness (Thomson et al., 2004; Zimmer et al., 2005). In EMU politics, this distributional dimension of conflict has an additional structural and economic rationale (Lehner & Wasserfallen, 2019). Within the Eurozone, countries with a high share of exports support fiscal discipline measures, whereas importing countries argue for fiscal transfers. This divide further intensifies as differences in competitiveness and balance-of-payments increase and accumulate (Copelovitch et al., 2016; Frieden & Walter, 2017). 4 From a perspective of multi-level governance, the question is not only about the stability of the EMU. It is also about whether the European Union should strengthen fiscal authority to back-up its political authority with discretion over resources that might address structural differences, but at the expense of intergovernmental consent and national governments' authority. In other words, should the EU remain fiscally imbalanced? 5 Predominantly three structural conditions (net-payer, export dominance, balance of payments surplus) are seen to undermine the support of European fiscal authority by individual member states. In the case of Germany, all three conditions are given and have traditionally been used to explain the German objection to fiscal transfers. A look at the manifestos for the election in 2021 indicates that there is widespread dissent about the willingness to grant transfers as well as impose fiscal discipline. The divide manifests itself between the ‘centre-right’ parties of the FDP/CDU and the ‘centre-left’ parties Greens/SPD. Albeit, CDU and FDP both defend the investment during the Corona pandemic, including the deficit in the European Budget as well as the investments related to Next Generation EU (also called recovery fund), both parties stress this consent to be a historical exception and attach an unmistakable warning to its potential continuation. Both parties univocally refuse common European debt and refer to the genuine responsibility of Member States for fiscal and budgetary policies. In their view, Europe should rather increase fiscal oversight. The CDU wants to reactivate the stability and growth mechanism (which was put on halt during the pandemic). The FDP envisages redesigning the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into a European Monetary Fund, a fund that should take responsibility for the oversight of macro-economic adjustments, and budgetary and economic policy of lender countries. Such a fund is argued to depoliticize the oversight of the stabilization funds. In contrast, the Greens and the SPD both support the expansion of fiscal competencies of the European Union and stress the importance of investments in contrast to fiscal discipline. Both parties welcome the recovery fund, not as a unique exception but as the starting point for more European investments. Both parties want to adapt the stability and growth pact into a sustainability pact, ready to accelerate investments instead of encouraging retrenchment. The Greens want to put the recovery fund under the control of the European Parliament. Both the SPD and the Greens support a true fiscal, economic and social union. Genuine European revenue components should be taxes on digital corporations, CO2-Border tax as well as revenues from the emission trade (Greens furthermore support a plastic tax 6 and the financial transaction tax). Both parties support qualified majority voting on fiscal matters to reduce tax competition and imply minimum taxation standards. Finally, the Greens want to set up a European Investment Fund that should invest in European public goods such as climate-related investments, research, digital infrastructure, railways, and education – more generally, a fund for countercyclical investments. Like the FDP, the Greens want to redesign the ESM into a European Monetary Fund. However, the Greens envisage unconditional short-term credits instead of strong conditionally and discipline enforcement. In short, there is a strong divide between the four major parties on the question of fiscal transfers versus fiscal discipline. Whereas the Greens and the SPD are supporting far-reaching investment and transfers – a position Greens have been consistently showing on lower levels of territoriality across Europe (see for example Röth & Schwander, 2021) – the FDP and CDU strongly encourage fiscal discipline and object to the idea of a ‘transfer union’. The third dimension involves the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). CSDP is traditionally anchored in the intergovernmental mode of decision-making (Rosato, 2011). Although differences in terms of security objectives within the Member States have increased due to the enlargement processes (Baun, 2005; Biava et al., 2011; Howorth, 2001), CSDP has recently been increasingly subject to politicization. Some see a particularly conducive actor-constellation for an integration push in the CSDP (Angelucci and Isernia, 2020). In particular, because CSDP is a cross-cutting issue for the radical left and radical right parties, CSDP could potentially be used to mobilize radical voters by Europhile mainstream parties (Angelucci & Isernia, 2020). In line with that argument, a look at the manifestos for the run-up to the election of 2021 indicates an overall consensus about the necessity to strengthen European defence and foreign policy capacities. All four major parties support a strengthening of the CSDP by supporting majority voting on issues of foreign policy in the Council of Europe. The high representative of European foreign and defence policy should be developed into a minister of foreign affairs and all parties welcome a common European army under the control of the European Parliament. Furthermore, all parties highlight the necessity to ensure compatibility between European and NATO structures. There are additional issues where the FDP and Greens can be seen as demanding more integration in the realm of CSDP as well as dissent about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Greens support a value-based European Foreign policy. Human rights are at the forefront of the Greens' foreign policy doctrine that includes using the economic weight of Europe to put pressure on countries that do not comply with rights standards. The Greens have a perspective on the conflict between and and support the of to and includes a commitment to military as a of to The Greens also address Russia with a warning to comply with the and demand the of because it is seen as a strategic to weaken Europe FDP that but to put the of to the European There are more hesitant for of CSDP in the manifestos of the coalition parties of CDU and Both parties do not and the SPD strongly to Russia into of the all major parties in Germany in 2021 signaled a commitment to a of CSDP, including majority parliamentary and genuine European military capacities. However, FDP, and CDU in the of economic as well as to Europe the to act and increase the FDP, and SPD remain on the foreign and security political that should the new European capacities. In contrast, the Greens their support for CSDP integration as to support rights in a conflict between and of the four major parties it into coalition in The CDU was from the for the first in 16 years and the Greens, FDP and SPD to a coalition on individual issues from manifestos are into coalition is but the clear think of the three conflict of European integration integration of decision-making fiscal transfers versus discipline, and supranational versus intergovernmental to coalition parties are in to across issues to 2014; & 2019). In such a parties their on an issue of importance to in a domain of is a for it is more likely that parties up their position on issues with whereas in high the necessity to and even potential conflict & 2013; & 2019). In short, the most is to be given to high issues with across coalition Accordingly, would but clear in the domain of integration and CSDP as all coalition parties have a high of agreement and would high and a lot of including safeguards and in the fiscal high levels of agreement across parties in the domain of supranational decision-making as well as CSDP into clear positions of the coalition. In the domain of supranational the differences across the three parties a commitment to a Federal based on a constitutional by the Conference of the Future of Europe. Accordingly, the strengthening of the European Parliament, expansion of majority and a strong commitment to the enforcement of the rule of law within the European Union parties have as individual Although the the of its it should be that it a strong for a deeper European political integration. can be from the domain of The of a of in the coalition contract. The coalition a stronger CSDP as to strengthen European A for the capacity to act is to qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union in matters of CSDP as well as to the role of the high representative into a European of Foreign The coalition to a stronger integration of the military of the member including the of European The of CSDP with NATO is Finally, the should be into CSDP with control Within the fiscal have been and for all parties this issue is of for The Greens and the SPD have a of the recovery fund, of the ESM by the genuine European tax and significant investments in the European The FDP to reactivate the ESM debt to the recovery fund, they from demanding European tax revenues and they have been in terms of a commitment to European investments. These differences are not in the coalition contract. The coalition hesitant to European investments but supranational to should infrastructure, research, and However, resources for such have to be organized in the intergovernmental mode of governance as European revenues are not The ESM is to have its the of the recovery fund is not and there is no to European there are to strengthen and reactivate fiscal oversight such as the European and the European In short, the FDP was rather in the of their safeguards for fiscal discipline, whereas the investment of the Green was in the coalition into hesitant and of The from the Green and also the SPD is by the of supranational fiscal whether might be related to transfers European debt or European revenues from It will be to such a position is The Greens the of the on Europe and have within the Council of the European Union. In of far-reaching fiscal the Greens might consent and the FDP might be in a to a Such a would be seen as a call for by a German coalition have the high to such a In short, most likely will see a between the Green for fiscal integration and European investments, the FDP in a There has been and about Germany's role in Europe. Germany is seen to have a role in the of the European Union & But Germany to supranational only in where supranational are with intergovernmental control and, are & 2016; & have the of 2016; & 2016; both have some However, a on preferences and also the coalition that structural explain only of the new German position on Europe. The Greens and to not an and their demand for a of transfers and European revenues the idea of integration as an unavoidable the role of the parties in the new the German government its role a in the of a for supranational integration. Accordingly, can that Germany a role for European integration in the domain of decision-making and of the differences in the fiscal I more light on the position of the German government in this Lehner and have the conflict over fiscal policy. 1 a and of the Member on European fiscal policy. The are from Lehner and and by a of the positions of German parties and government in based on the European Commission European Union Council European Parliament and Council European and Lehner and have positions to the on the same The is with the of by et which that Member States positions the most in terms of The only in the structural with and trade as well as to European the that is the with the support for fiscal transfers to its as the second most important to European but is in line with the more important and and trade In contrast, Germany has an and trade and is the most important to European However, the that major German parties such as the Greens and the SPD support positions in line with significant fiscal transfers might that there the structural economic an additional of Member positions (see for example et al., 2016). is not a of the German ‘centre-right’ and not the left and The Green perspective of economic for Germany and Europe is based on a strong for a increase of investments, that different from other parties, only to a as or equalization transfers. They the idea of investments in a new economic that is to within circumstances. Furthermore, the structural economic conditions for Germany have recently a of the pandemic, widespread sanctions on Russia and the of war in Ukraine, German trade have been and will be of the In the political and economic it might also be a traditional economic rationale to and invest in the economic of the European Union as the most important for German The is an German a new for and permanent investments in Europe while fiscal discipline of the member at the same The of such a and German on its with and Germany have strong in the & 2019). Both have been at the of the fiscal conflict and given their in EU they have been the of the This an for which in this broader conflict political support among all EU Member States. A German by the Greens, will the for agreement towards more transfers and particular towards European investments. The on the run-up to the German federal election in the coalition as well as the likely for European politics as a of the new German government coalition. I manifestos and coalition in three conflict about the of the European Union. These are the decision-making European fiscal and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The that the coalition parties SPD and the share widespread agreement on the necessity for deeper integration of decision-making as well as These into and clear positions in the coalition contract. In contrast, differences the divide in the fiscal dimension of Europe. and the FDP/CDU can be on opposite of the divide between of fiscal transfers and those of fiscal discipline. the coalition many about the European fiscal policy that to to investments with for fiscal discipline. However, in to German government this is a towards fiscal transfers and will for to the fiscal transfer of the political In particular with the of a and for a transfer union. In the new coalition government an willingness for deeper European integration. Nonetheless, it would be to the new commitment to Europe to the of and in particular the of the with Putin's Russia and have it clear to that Europe to its capacity to act in a A government including the CDU would have for many of the integration steps However, within the new government, there are three different The SPD for the of and the FDP as the of fiscal discipline, of German within Europe. It is the Greens a new tone that both the of the coalition of CDU and SPD as well as the calls for fiscal The Greens an that of European integration and to European on the of and the Greens to be in the new German government with their approach, the German role within Europe will be substantially and organized by