Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work
提出一种新的两阶段机制，在完全信息环境下通过初始理性化完全实施任何社会选择函数，理论证明其对少量不完全信息稳健，实验表明能有效诱导真实报告和高效投资。
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that an SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided holdup problem with ex ante investment.