Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
利用1998年美国监管覆盖范围的意外变化，研究发现被排除在监管之外的借款人贷款成本下降约18%，大银行利用这一变化规避高风险贷款的监管，而小银行则增加受监管贷款以降低信息不对称。
Abstract U.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan‐level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.