Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints
研究了在标准金融契约模型中，投资者如何在不同生产技术异质的企业家中选择，揭示了生产技术差异如何导致最优契约和代理租金不同，进而影响投资者的投资决策和企业家面临的金融约束。
This paper studies the investor’s investment decision in a standard financial contracting model. The investor chooses among entrepreneurs with heterogeneous production technologies who generate different probability distributions of cash flow under effort. I provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts, agency rents, and the investor’s investment decision. Differences in entrepreneurs’ production technologies imply differences in optimal contracts and agency rents across equally productive entrepreneurs, which biases and potentially distorts the investor’s investment decision. The results provide a complete characterization of entrepreneurs’ financial constraints in the presence of heterogeneous production technologies and uncover a fundamental link between production technologies, financial contracts, and financial constraints. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: This work was supported by the Swedish House of Finance.