Robust Incentives for Teams
研究要求团队激励对代理人博弈中的非量化不确定性保持稳健，会导致利益一致的合同，在预算平衡下简化为线性合同，从而将利润分享或股权识别为最优合同，但仍有搭便车问题。
We show that demanding team incentives to be robust to nonquantifiable uncertainty about the game played by the agents leads to contracts that align the agents' interests. Such contracts have a natural interpretation as team‐based compensation. Under budget balance they reduce to linear contracts, thus identifying profit‐sharing, or equity, as an optimal contract absent a sink or a source of funds. A linear contract also gives the best profit guarantee to an outside residual claimant. These contracts still suffer from the free‐rider problem, but a positive guarantee obtains if and only if the technology known to the contract designer is sufficiently productive.