How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources
研究一个多战场攻防博弈的均衡，其中一方有固定预算，另一方可按边际成本调动任意资源，发现固定预算方在预算不低于总价值一半时可确保全胜。
We study equilibrium in a multi-battle attack-and-defense game in which victory in each single battle is deterministically awarded to the player who expends more conflict resources in the respective battle. One player has a pre-determined budget which can be allocated across two battlefields. The cost of the budget is sunk. The other player can mobilize an arbitrary amount of resources at given marginal costs. Our analysis reveals a strategic advantage of the player with the fixed and given budget: this player wins all battlefields with probability one if the budget is at least half the total value of winning.