The Distribution of Voting Rights to Shareholders
首次全面研究股东投票权的分布，发现公司91%的情况下事后才公布股权登记日，有争议投票时更可能相反，且与股东提案通过率低相关；纽交所向特定投资者出售非公开登记日信息，除权后股价下跌、交易量激增，表明活跃投资者在购买边际投票权。
Abstract This is the first comprehensive study of the distribution of voting rights to shareholders. Only individuals owning stock on a record date may vote. Firms, however, reveal record dates after the fact 91% of the time. With controversial votes, firms are more likely to do the opposite, and this tendency is associated with a lower passage rate for shareholder-initiated proposals. The New York Stock Exchange sells nonpublic record-date information to select investors. When stocks go ex vote, prices decline and trading volume surges, suggesting that activist investors are buying marginal votes. These trends are most pronounced with controversial votes.