Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?
构建了一个充分统计量框架，分析残疾保险中资格规则与福利水平两个政策参数的福利效应，并应用于奥地利改革，发现收紧资格规则优于减少福利。
This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social‐optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.