Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
研究了供应合同最优期限如何平衡重新选择供应商的成本与长期锁定低效供应商的成本，并用联邦采购数据量化了交易成本，发现其远超消费者转换成本。
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this trade-off and provide an empirical strategy for quantifying (unobserved) transaction costs. I estimate the model using federal supply contracts for a standardized product, where suppliers are selected by procurement auctions. The estimated transaction costs are substantially greater than consumer switching costs and a significant portion of total buyer costs. Counterfactuals illustrate the importance of accounting for the duration margin.