A Theory of Crime and Vigilance
研究了潜在受害者选择警惕水平如何影响犯罪率，发现提高惩罚可能反而增加犯罪，政府补贴警惕比增加惩罚更有效，且犯罪率随财产价值先升后降。
This paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially optimal ones. Finally, the crime rate first rises and then falls in the property value at stake, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.