Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation
研究了企业合谋定价时消费者提起反垄断诉讼的情形，分析了集体诉讼作为规模经济机制的社会合意性，并考虑了代理问题、和解、费用转移、三倍赔偿、公共执法等因素。
When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms’ incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play are also considered.