Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition
研究候选人异质性下的动态选举竞争模型，发现任期限制能增强选民议价能力、提高福利，尤其在战略进入时更有效，并比较了资历上限与随机任期限制的福利效果。
I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates’ and voters’ policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters’ threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters’ bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is strategic, as in that case strong incumbents face weaker competition. The paper also compares the welfare properties of seniority caps and stochastic term limits.