Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
研究了竞拍者在拍卖前自愿披露估值信息对最优拍卖结果的影响，发现若基准情形下物品有正概率流拍，则信息披露总能提高拍卖人收益。
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequences of information disclosure for the auctioneer’s revenue. If in the benchmark without disclosure the object remains unsold with positive probability, then disclosure yields strictly higher revenue in every equilibrium.