Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform
利用美国上市公司分阶段披露CEO与员工薪酬比率的规定，研究发现总薪酬变化不大，但董事会调整了薪酬结构，减少对股价敏感的股权薪酬，且高比率公司引发更多负面媒体报道和投资者反应。
ABSTRACT Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock‐based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative‐toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say‐on‐pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.