Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit
研究发现，当银行总部所在州的政策不确定性因州长选举而上升时，银行会减少抵押贷款供应，且选举限制任期或竞争激烈时影响更大。
Abstract We document that banks reduce the supply of mortgage loans when policy uncertainty increases in their headquarter states as measured by the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections. The reduction is larger for term‐limited elections and close elections. We utilize high‐frequency, geographically granular loan‐level data to address an identification problem arising from changing local loan demand: (i) we estimate a difference‐in‐difference specification with state/time or county/time fixed effects; (ii) banks reduce lending outside their home states as well when their home states hold elections; and (iii) we observe important cross‐sectional differences in the way banks with different characteristics respond to policy uncertainty.