PI-Based Security Control Against Joint Sensor and Controller Attacks and Applications in Load Frequency Control
研究了大规模系统在随机联合攻击下的比例积分安全控制问题，攻击同时影响传感器和控制器，通过观测器补偿和稳定性条件设计控制器，并在IEEE 39节点电力系统上验证有效性。
This article addresses the proportional-integral (PI)-based security control issue of large-scale systems subject to randomly occurring joint attacks. Specifically, the considered cyber-attacks could happen in both sensor-to-observer and controller-to-actuator, and only partial data of sensors and controllers are randomly tampered with by malicious attacks due to energy limits. For the addressed problem, an observer-based PI controller is constructed by resorting to the compensation of randomly occurring joint attacks, which are modeled by two diagonal matrices combined with a set of stochastic variables. A sufficient condition only dependent on the local system dynamics as well as the local interconnected matrices is derived in the framework of the input-to-state stability (ISS) theory, and the desired gains of both the controller and the observer are obtained by the cone complementarity linearization (CCL) algorithm. Benefiting from the element matrix inequality, the developed design scheme satisfies the scalability requirement. In the end, the simulation test based on IEEE 39-bus power systems is seriously used to demonstrate the validity of the proposed control scheme.