The optimal assortativity of teams inside the firm
研究了当工人有私人生产率信息且团队内付出隐藏努力时，利润最大化的经理如何组建团队并支付报酬，发现逆向选择和道德风险的交互作用在互补性较弱时可能导致非匹配性匹配。
Abstract How does a profit‐maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers when workers have private information about their productivity and exert hidden effort once in a team? We study a team‐production model in which positive assortative matching is both efficient and profit‐maximizing under pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard. We show that the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to nonassortative matching if complementarities are sufficiently weak. When this is the case, the manager may prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams.