On the informed principal model with common values
研究了共同价值下知情委托人模型的均衡特征，给出了限制直接显示机制不失一般性的条件，并提供了保险、采购等应用问题的求解指南。
Abstract In the informed principal model with common values, I provide conditions that allow for the characterization of the set of equilibria of the game in which the principal makes a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer of a mechanism to the agent. I further examine if and when restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. Last, I provide clear guidelines for solving economic applications, such as insurance, procurement, security design, and bilateral trading, of the informed principal model. The results are compared with and shown to significantly differ from those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992).