A Field Experiment on Labor Market Speeddates for Unemployed Workers
通过实地实验评估失业工人与临时就业机构的速配活动，发现参与能立即提高就业率6-7个百分点，但长期效果有限，对失业保险管理机构而言成本有效。
We conduct a field experiment to evaluate labor market speeddates where unemployed workers meet temporary employment agencies. Participation in such events increases immediate job finding by six to seven percentage points. Afterwards employment effects diminish, suggesting that temporary employment has no long‐lasting effect on employment prospects. While the intervention is cost‐effective for the unemployment insurance (UI) administration, higher labor earnings of treated job seekers do not compensate for the decline in benefit payments. Survey evidence shows that speeddate participation increases job search motivation and reduces reservation wages. These findings concur with predictions of a model where job seekers update their labor market beliefs.