Adaptation and Adverse Selection in Markets for Natural Disaster Insurance
量化了自然灾害保险市场的参保摩擦，检验逆向选择，并分析政策改革的福利效应。研究发现高风险区房主投保意愿极低，且选择基于可观察的适应差异而非私人风险信息，这改变了政策福利预测的符号。
This paper quantifies frictions in uptake, tests for adverse selection, and analyzes welfare effects of proposed reforms in natural disaster insurance markets. I find that willingness to pay is remarkably low. In high-risk flood zones, fewer than 60 percent of homeowners purchase flood insurance even though premiums are only two-thirds of own costs. Estimating flood insurance demand and cost elasticities using house-level variation in premiums from recent US congressional reforms reveals that these homeowners select into insurance based on observable differences in adaptation but not private information about risk. These findings change the sign of predicted welfare effects of proposed policies.