Third-Party Moral Hazard and the Problem of Insurance Externalities
研究发现保险不仅会刺激投保人，还会刺激未投保的第三方制造损失或索赔，这种现象称为第三方道德风险，其负面影响比以往认为的更严重，需要新的政策应对。
Insurance can lead to loss or claim creation not only by insureds but also by uninsured third parties. These externalities—which we call third-party moral hazard—arise because insurance creates opportunities both to extract rents and to recover otherwise unrecoverable losses. Using examples from health, automobile, kidnap, and liability insurance, we demonstrate that the phenomenon is widespread and important and that the downsides of insurance are greater than previously believed. We explain the economic, social, and psychological reasons for this phenomenon and propose policy responses. Contract-based methods that are traditionally used to control first-party moral hazard can be welfare reducing in the context of its third-party analog, so new approaches are required.